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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its Road Commission, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LLOYDSTANGER~dEDNA 
OLSON STANGER, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
11028 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a highway condemnation action brought by 
the plaintiff against defendants to acquire certain lands 
from the latter, wherein the issues before this Court 
relate to whether or not defendants can recover dam-
ages sustained by their contiguous remaining properties 
by reason of the loss of the lands taken and the con-
struction of the project in the manner contemplated. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LO,'VER COURT 
The issues in this matter were reduced to a jury 
determination of the amount of "severance" damages, 
if any, sustained by defendant's remaining properties 
by reason of the taking of .89 acre of land. The parties 
had previously stipulated as to the fair market value 
of the land taken. 
From a jury verdict awarding defendants no 
"severance" damages, defendants filed a Motion for 
New Trial (R. 43), based primarily upon errors during 
the trial consisting of erroneous oral instructions and 
erroneous written instructions given to the jury at the 
end of the trial. The Motion for New Trial was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek reversal of the Judgment on 
Special Verdict entered in this matter and of the Order 
denying them a new trial, and request that the matter 
be remanded to the Second Judicial District Court in 
and for Weber County for a new trial. Further, be-
cause of the importance of the issues involved in this 
case and many other pending cases, it is necessary that 
this Court clearly rule on the material distinctions be-
tween "severance" and "consequential" damages in 
eminent domain cases, and establish guidelines relating 
to the application of the doctrine of sovereign immu· 
nity-or to abolish it-in eminent domain cases. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 21, 1965, plaintiff served a condem-
nation complaint upon defendants for the purpose of 
acquiring a portion of defendants' lands for highway 
uses incident to the construction of the Interstate Free-
way Project, which ran in a general north-south direc-
tion through Weber County in the area of the com-
munity of Marriott. Defendants owned approximately 
23 acres of land on the north side of the center line of 
Seventh Street, together with a residence and miscel-
laneous outbuildings located at the extreme southwest 
corner of their holdings. 
To assist the Court reference will be made to Ex-
hibit A, which was the trial map prepared by the plain-
tiff for the use of the trial of this matter. Exhibit A 
shows the relationship of defendants' lands to the Free-
way, the location of their improvements, the area taken 
for highway purposes, the prior location of Seventh 
Street, and the location of the Interstate Freeway. 
Before the construction of the freeway project 
Seventh Street was a level road extending in an east-
west direction along the entire south side of defendants' 
properties, and their residence and garage were so lo-
cated that direct ingress and egress to and from Seventh 
Street was had on a level grade (See Exh. 1 and 2). 
The main portion of the Interstate Freeway did 
not require the taking of any lands from defendants 
since it passed their properties a short distance imme-
diately west of their west property line; however, as 
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a part of the project it was determined that the origin-
ally level Seventh Street must be so altered that it 
should pass over and above the Interstate Freeway. To 
accomplish this a large overpass embankment was 
constructed on both sides of the Interstate Freeway in 
the general area of what formerly was Seventh Street. 
In order to a void the removal and taking of several 
homes in the area, the overpass fill veered slightly to 
the south as it approached the Interstate Freeway 
from its east side (thereby requiring the taking of lands 
south of the original right-of-way line of Seventh Street 
on the east side of the Interstate Freeway), and on 
the west side of the Interstate Freeway the overpass 
fill veered even farther to the south of the former 
Seventh Street at the point where it crossed the Inter-
state Freeway so that, at that point, it was on lands 
completely south of the south right-of-way line of 
Seventh Street as it previously existed (Tr. 86). As 
the overpass road continued westerly it veered back 
to the north several hundred feet west of the Interstate 
Freeway so as to again join the original Seventh 
Street at grade. The "bend" in the route of the re-
constructed Seventh Street thereby missed several homes 
on the north side of what was formerly Seventh Street 
on the west side of the Freeway; only the defendants' 
home was involved on the same side of Seventh Street 
on the east side of the Freeway. 
By its Complaint (R. I) plaintiff sought to acquire 
fee title to the .89 acre of land shown on Exhibit A. 
Of the total area taken, .66 acre consisted of a strip 
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of land varying between 30 and. 40 feet in width and 
running most of the distance along their south boundary 
line, but which was within and constituted the north 
half of previously existing Seventh Street. The addi-
tional .23 acre of land was taken from within the occu-
pied area of the Stanger holding so as to furnish an 
area for the construction of a service road serving the 
Stanger home and providing access at the easterly 
end of the overpass constructed on Seventh Street. 
Because the .66 acre in the right-of-way area of Seventh 
Street had long been subjected to a public easement 
for travel, the parties stipulated that the net taking 
of .23 acre should be valued at $517.00. Each appraiser 
(Tr. 35, 68) agreed that the land value on a per-acre 
basis along the north side of Seventh Street had a fair 
market value of $2,250.00 per acre and, as testified to 
by defendants' appraiser, Haven J. Barlow, had a high-
est and best use as residential property (Tr. 24-25). 
The effect of the taking required defendants to 
secure access from their home and other buildings to 
the re-constructed Seventh Street at a point where 
the overpass leveled off on the east side of the freeway 
via a service road requiring a traveling distance of 
approximately 400 feet (Exh. A), as compared to their 
former means of access directly onto Seventh Street 
in front of their residence. This service road dead-
ended against the Interstate Freeway fence approxi-
mately 200 feet west of their home, serving no other 
homes in the area; in fact, the service road through 
the west one-half of its distance from its connection to 
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re-constructed Seventh Street utilized the north half of 
what formerly was Seventh Street. 
In addition, directly in front of their home an 
earthen-type embankment was constructed at a height 
of 17 feet above the original level of Seventh Street 
(Tr. 6), and the base, or "toe" of the embankment was 
79 feet from defendants' residence (Tr. 86). 
The trial of the damage issue involved started off 
with an underlying basic dispute between plaintiff's 
counsel and the Court, on the one side, and defendants' 
counsel on the other side. The initial dispute centered 
around the matter of "severance" damages and what 
factors contributing to damage could be considered by 
the appraisers and the jury. Further, the additional 
legal issue developed as the trial progressed relating 
to whether any or all of the damages sustained by de-
fendants' remaining properties were recoverable in view 
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
Following the holding of the trial judge and the 
position taken by the plaintiff, the plaintiff's appraiser 
testified that the remaining properties of the defendants 
suffered no "severance" damages (Tr. 68), while the 
appraiser for the defendants testified that their remain· 
ing properties had suffered "severance" damages in 
the amount of $5,806.00 (Tr. 38). Plaintiff took the 
position that "severance" damages had to be special, 
peculiar and unique to the properties of the defendants 
as compared with damages which others in the general 
neighborhood whose properties had not been taken 
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might suffer (Tr. 70-71) ; in fact, plaintiff's counsel 
in his opening statement based his case on the premise 
that the State would show that defendants' damages 
were not in fact peculiar to their properties (Tr. 66). 
This same position, plus the additional claim of sove-
reign immunity, was advanced by plaintiff in its Motion 
For Directed Verdict (Tr. 65-66). Although the Court 
reserved ruling on the Motion For Directed Verdict, 
throughout the trial the lower Court adopted the iden-
tical position of the plaintiff as to its interpretation 
of what constituted "severance" damages and its posi-
tion relating to the State's immunity from liability in 
this case under the sovereign immunity doctrine. 
Defendants contended that "severance" damages 
need not be special, peculiar or unique to their properties 
as distinguished from similar damage sustained by 
others in the neighborhood who might not be in court, 
and further claimed that the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity was totally inapplicable in this proceeding. 
Facing an uphill battle throughout the trial on the 
legal principles involved, defendants suffe~ed an adverse 
6-2 jury verdict, holding that their remaining properties 
had sustained no "severance" damages. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE VARIOUS FACTORS WHICH CON-
TRIBUTE TO SEVERANCE DA~IAGES IN 
AN EMINENT DOMAIN ACTION DO NOT 
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HAVE TO BE SPECIAL AND UNIQUE FROM 
THOSE SUSTAINED BY OTHER PROPER-
TIES IN 'l'HE GENERAL NEIGHBORHOOD 
IN ORDER TO BE CONSIDERED. 
Throughout the trial of this matter the trial judge 
repeatedly furnished the jury with illustrations of situ-
ations where land owners could not recover damages 
to their remaining properties in eminent domain actions 
-even though a portion of their lands had actually 
been taken - unless the damages to their remaining 
properties were unusual or unique to the neighborhood 
in general. For instance, one of the several remarks made 
to the jury during the course of the trial was as follows 
(Tr. 43): 
" . . . whether these people are so closely in-
volved in this project because they have lost this 
piece of land, it h£U to be unique in the neighbor-
hood so that their difference is a genuine sever-
ance damage. This will be a fact question that 
you will have to determine. (Italics added) 
* * * 
"Now, whether this case is severance damage 
or consequential damage is for you to deter· . .. 
mme. (Tr. 42) 
In the Court's instructions to the jury at the con· 
clusion of the trial, the same requirement was impressed 
on the jury that damages to the remaining properties 
of the defendants must be unique and different from 
the type of damage which others in the neighborhood 
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might suffer in order to constitute severance damage. 
In Instruction No, 7, the Court first correctly informed 
the jury that the method to be employed in determining 
damages to the remaining property of the defendants 
would be to consider the value of the remaining prop-
erty before the severance of the part acquired and, 
secondly, the value of the remaining property after 
severance. This statement substantially states the gen-
eral rule of the measure of damages to remaining prop-
erties which is followed in Utah. However, in the 
second and last paragraph of Instruction No. 7 the 
following incorrect statement of law was added by Lhe 
Court over defendants' objection: 
"This is true if the loss in value is the result 
of severing part of the land from the whole 
thereof and construction of the project as de-
signed; but it is not true if the loss in value is 
in part, or entirely, because of the projects 
(project's) presents (presence) in the general 
area independant (independent) of this taking 
of the defendants' land not sufficiently related 
thereto so as to situation the defendant land 
owner differently then (than) neighbors who 
have not lost lands." (R. 38-7) 
It is submitted that the trial judge was clearly 
wrong in his statements to the jury regarding severance 
damages, both as to comments made during trial and 
in Instruction No. 7, in requiring that such damages 
must be unique and different from those suffered by 
other properties in the neighborhood. It is further sub-
mitted that the trial judge completely confused the 
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rule with respect to severance damages with the rule 
applicable in cases involving consequential damages. 
In order to properly understand the issue presented 
in this portion of the argument, it is well to define our 
terms and to examine past Utah Supreme Court deci-
sions in the field of eminent domain. Section 78-34-10, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, outlines three pertinent 
sub-sections relating to the types of compensation and 
damages to be awarded in an eminent domain proceed-
ing. These sub-sections will here be separately listed, 
with a statement in parenthesis under each indicating 
the type of compensation or damage which is present 
for classification purposes: 
(1) 
(2) 
The value is the property sought to be con-
demned and all improvements thereon ap-
pertaining to the realty, and of each and 
every separate estate or interest therein; 
and if it consists of different parcels, the 
value of each parcel and of each estate or 
interest therein shall be separately assessed. 
(This is compensation for the TAKING) 
If the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, 
the damages which will accrue to the portion 
not sought to be condemned by reason of 
its severance from the portion sought to be 
condemned and the construction of the im-
provement in the manner proposed by the 
plaintiff. 
(This is SEVERANCE damage) 
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( 3) If the property, though no part thereof is 
taken, will be damaged by the construction 
of the proposed improvement, the amount 
of such damages. 
(This is CONSEQUENTIAL damage) 
Our Utah Supreme Court has consistently fol-
lowed the foregoing classification of damages in its 
rnrious deciisons in recent years. In the case of Spring-
ville Banking Company v. Burton (1960) 10 U. 2d 
100, 349 P. 2d 1.57, wherein no property was actually 
taken, but a street was divided in front of appellant's 
business establishment by the placement of concrete 
islands therein, this Court clearly held that such an 
action involved damages which were consequential in 
nature: 
"We espouse the notion that if the sovereign 
exercises its police power reasonably and for the 
good of all the peo_ple, when constructing high-
ways, the consequential damages such as those 
alleged here, are not compensable." 
Similarly, in the case of Fairclough v. Salt Lake 
County (1960) 10 U. 2d 417, 354 P. 2d 105, the high-
way grade was reduced about 16 feet below the property 
owner's abutting land, without there being an actual 
taking of his property. Again, this Court recognized 
the situation as one involving consequential damages. 
Further, in the case of Parker (Sine) v. State Road 
Commission (1962), 13 U.2d 65, 368 P. 2d 585, wherein 
there was no actual taking of affected properties, the 
distinction between severance and consequential dam-
ages was again brought out: 
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"Contentions ( l) and ( 3) may be viewed in 
the aggregate, since both pose the same funda-
mental question whether the State is suable for 
consequential damage to property not sought for 
condemnation." 
In the developme11t of our Utah eminent domain 
law it is the present rule that cases involving conse-
quential damages wherein the State of Utah is or might 
be a party litigant in court are controlled by the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity, which places the State of 
Utah beyond the grasp of the law. In short, under 
sub-section ( 3) of Section 78-34-10, supra, the State 
of Utah cannot be brought into court by any means 
whatever (except in rare cases), and consequential 
damages can only be secured by property owners 
against condemning authorities unable to get under the 
cloak of sovereign immunity, such as railroads and 
similarly situated utilities and agencies having eminent 
domain authority. 
The distinction between severance damages and 
consequential damages has best been illustrated in Utah 
in the case of Board of Education of Logan City v. 
Croft (1962), 13 U. 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 697, involving 
the condemnation of certain lands for school grounds 
purposes. In that case the jury verdict form provided 
for damages in three parts - for the value of lands 
taken, for severance damages, and for consequential 
damages. In analyzing the situation this Court held 
that there could be no award for consequential damages 
since the award for severance damages "covered" and 
included consequential damages. 
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As a matter of fact, under the distinction between 
severance damages and consequential damages spelled 
out by our statute and the foregoing court decisions, 
there could never be both severance and consequential 
damage evidence in the same case where a partial taking 
occurs. Consequently, the trial judge's comment to the 
jury during the trial of this case constitutes an incor-
rect statement of the law: 
"It is possible for the same piece of land to 
suffer both consequential damages, which is not 
recoverable, and severance damages ... I will 
leave that to the jury." (Tr. 43) 
A careful reading of the Croft case clearly points 
out the errors which the trial judge in this case adopted, 
in (a) failing to properly distinguish between sever-
ance damages and consequential damages, and (b) in 
failing to realize that the same elements and items of 
damages are not applicable to each. In the Croft case 
this entire matter was answered in one paragraph, as 
follows: 
"Damages to land, by the construction of a 
public or industrial improvement, though no part 
thereof is taken as provided for under 78-34-10 
( 3), contrary to the rule for severance damages, 
is limited to injuries that would be actionable 
at common law, or where there has been some 
physical disturbance of a right, either public 
or private ,which the owner enjoys in connection 
with his prQoerty and which gives it additional 
yalue, and ~ich causes him to sustain a special 
damage with respect to his property in excess 
of that sustained by the public generally. It re-
13 
quires a definite physical injury cognizable to 
the sense with a perceptible effect on the present 
market value; such as drying up wells and 
springAJ destroying lateral supports, preventing 
surface waters from running off adjacent lands, 
or the depositing of cinders and other foreign 
materials on neighboring lands by the permanent 
operation of the business or improvement estab-
lished on the adjoining lands." 
(I tali cs added) 
The foregoing statement clearly explains what type 
of injury constitutes consequential damages. Further, 
it clearly states that the measure of severance damages 
is not restricted and limited as with those situations 
involving consequential damages; and in support there-
of adopts the rule from 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain 
326, Sec. 6.411 ( 1). As pointed out by Nichols in his 
general discussion of the subject (Sec. 6.441 - Sec. 
6.4432 ( 2) ) , consequential damages must be special 
and unique from those generally sustained in the gen-
eral neighborhood; while severance damages are not so 
restricted and follow the general valuation rule set 
down in the case of Weber Basin v. Ward (1959), 10 
U. 2d 29, 347 P. 2d 862, as follows: 
" ... all factors bearing upon ... value that 
any prudent purchaser would take into account 
... should be given consideration, ... " 
A case of recent vintage from South Carolina will 
be cited at this point to further illustrate the error of 
the trial court's thinking that severance damages must 
be special and unique in the neighborhood in order to 
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be considered. In South Carolina Highway Dept. v. 
Touchberry ( 1966) , 148 SE 2d 7 47, the general rule 
is quoted from 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Sec. 
14.l at page 473: 
"A distinction must be drawn between conse-
quential* damages to a remainder area where 
part of a tract is physically appropriated and 
consequential damages to a tract no part of 
which is physically appropriated. In the latte:r 
case the damage must be peculiar to such land 
and not such as is suffered in common with the 
general public. In the former case it matters not 
that the in;ury is suffered in common with the 
general public." (Italics added) 
*This type of "consequential damage" is de-
fined by statute as 'severance' damage in 
Utah. Nichols points out (Sec. 6.4432) that, 
broadly speaking, " ... all damages must of 
necessity be consequential since all damage 
is the consequence of an injurious act." 
In State Highway Commission v. Bloom, 93 N.W. 
2d 572 (S. D. 1958), the court cited 18 Am. Jur., 
Eminent Domain, Sec. 265, and said on page 577: 
"But where a part of an owner's parcel or 
tract of land is taken for a public improvement 
such as a public highway the owner is entitled 
to be compensation for the part taken and for 
consequential damages to the part not taken 
even though the consequential damage is of a 
kind suffered by the public in common." 
(I tali cs added) 
In the Bloom case the court went on to hold that 
for the purpose of determining severance damage to 
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the part not taken, the part of defendant's land taken 
is to be considered as an integral and inseparable part 
of a single highway project not limited to the segment 
of the highway on his land. 
27 Am. J ur. 2d, E1nine nt Domain (which is the 
present counterpart of 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain, 
Sec. 265), at Section 310, p. 124 elaborates on the fore-
going rule: 
"Where part of a parcel of land is taken by 
eminent domain, the owner is not restricted to 
compensation for the land actually taken; he is 
also entitled to recover for the damage to his 
remaining land. In other words, he is entitled 
to full compensation for the taking of his land 
and all its consequences, and the right to recover 
for the damage to his remaining land is not 
based upon the theory that damage to such land 
constitutes a taking of it, nor is there any re-
quirement that the damage be special and pe-
culiar, or such as would be actionable at common 
law; it is enough that it is a consequence of the 
taking · · · " (I tali cs added) 
There are numerous cases from other states setting 
forth the foregoing rule, but the law is so clear as to 
require no further emphasis in this writer's opinion. 
There is a sound practical reason why there should 
be no attempt to segregate factors contributing to 
severance damages on the basis of whether or not such 
factors are unique to the affected property or whether 
such factors generally, equally or to some lesser degree, 
affect other lands in the vicinity. Following the "before-
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and-after" rule, which is the general rule applied in 
determining severance damages in Utah, an appraiser 
compares the remaining property not taken as it was 
in its former condition as part of the whole, and as it 
subsequently exists in its severed condition. From this 
comparison he forms an opinion as to the total differ-
ence in market value caused by the taking and the con-
struction of the public improvement in the manner 
contemplated. This difference, or "severance" damage, 
is not an amount of money which he or a jury can 
usually separate with any degree of precision so as to 
point out what portion of the damage might be attribut· 
able to one factor and what portion might be attribut· 
able to another factor. The problem becomes readily 
apparent, and the resulting confusion from such an 
attempt would almost always produce ridiculous results. 
In short, such an approach would clearly abandon the 
"before-and-after" rule of damages to remaining prop-
erties which remain in their severed condition, and a 
trial would degenerate into a knit-picking expedition. 
'\T orse still, most trials would get so involved with the 
issue of whether or not a neighboring property not 
involved in court proceedings sustained greater or lesser 
damages-and the degree of such damage-as actually 
happened in this trial, that other people's problems 
would become the greater part of a trial. The obvious 
prejudice to the involved litigant becomes readily 
1 apparent. 
The trial of this case actually illustrated the very 
problem just mentioned since the plaintiff, with the 
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approval of the trial judge, went into substantial detail 
attempting to show that other residences and properties 
on the west side of the freeway-and also being on the 
north side of Seventh Street-sustained damages by 
reason of the construction project. The State's appraiser 
pointed out that he felt there were three homes on the 
west side of the freeway sustaining somewhat the same 
type of damage due to the construction of the over-
pass and the location of the homes on a dead-end street 
(Tr. 70-71), to which defendants' witness Barlow 
pointed out that, although at least one of the homes 
across the freeway sustained some damage caused by 
being on a dead-end road, the damage sustained by 
the defendants' properties was much worse, and that 
there was no real similarity at all (Tr. 88). Actually, 
the most affected residence on the west side of the free-
way was 118 feet from the toe of the freeway fill (as 
compared with a distance of 79 feet from the toe of 
the fill to the defendants' residence), since the location 
of the overpass fill on the west side of the freeway was 
placed entirely beyond the south right-of-way line of 
what was formerly Seventh Street. Likewise, while the 
defendants' residence faced an embankment of 17 feet, 
the most affected residence on the west side of the free-
way-which was located 118 feet from the toe of the 
fill-was only faced with an embankment of 6' 9". The 
dissimilarity and degree of damage was major between 
the properties of these defendants and any other prop-
erty similarly affected across the freeway but, as pointed 
out in Instruction No. 7, since another property not 
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involved in a condemnation action sustained a damage 
-though lesser in degree-of a similar nature to that 
sustained by these defendants' properties, the jury 
could well find as it did. 
On the general subject of attempting to segregate 
and place values upon different factors contributing to 
damage to remaining properties, the Appellate Division 
of the Supreme Court of New York (1967) in the case 
of Dennison v. State, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 257, pointed out 
that a consideration of noise as a factor contributing 
to damages was not separable from other concededly 
legitimate factors, and therefore, was not subject to 
a valuation by the Appellant Court. It also pointed out 
that the inter-relation of noise with elements such as 
vision and privacy would have made it impossible to 
attribute a separate specific amount to noise. However, 
the issue was resolved since the court held noise was 
properly considered a factor of damage caused by the 
construction of a new highway. 
Having covered the distinction between severance 
and consequential damages under Utah law, it now 
becomes necessary to analyze the facts of this case to 
determine which type of damage situation presented 
itself here. There is absolutely no dispute but that the 
State Road Commission instituted a condemnation 
action against these defendants, and that it had to do 
so because it was acquiring specific fee title interests 
in and to .89 acre of their real properties. An exami-
nation of the Trial l\'Iap (Exh. A) indicates that the 
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plaintiff condemned a strip of land running along the 
south side of their larger holding of approximately 23 
acres. The lands actually taken included a strip of 
land varying between 30 feet to 40 feet in width, lying 
between the center line of Seventh Street and the en-
closed or occupied area of defendants' holdings (within 
which taken area of public easement for highway pur-
poses had been created over the years), plus a wider 
strip extending into a portion of the defendants' 
holdings to which no public easement had ever been 
created-thereby providing a route whereby defendants 
could secure access onto the re-constructed Seventh 
Street which passed over the Interstate Freeway. 
There can be no doubt whatever that the State of 
Utah was properly in court; in fact, it had to bring 
the action to acquire the properties taken in the litiga-
tion. In addition, since the construction of the project 
in the area deprived defendants of their former means 
of ingress and egress to Seventh Street which they had 
used for a great many years (See Exhibits D-1 and 
D-2, which show the condition of the affected premises 
prior to any construction) , plus the construction of 
a 17 foot fill directly in front of the home of the de-
fendants, there was also a taking of property rights 
of light and view, and of access. These special items 
of taking will be discussed in the next section. 
At this point it is well to analyze the factual situ-
ation to determine whether, as the lower Court felt, 
this case comes within the doctrine of sovereign immu-
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nity under the case of State Road Commission v. Parker 
(Sine), 1962, 13 U. 2d 65, 368 P. 2d 585. The trial 
judge, after extensive exceptions were taken to the 
Instructions by defendants' counsel, stated (Tr. 112 )-
"I think the Syms (Sine) case, I'm adopting 
the position and the interpretation of the Syms' 
case to be that the vulnerability of the state to 
damages in this proceeding are not greater; does 
not reach matters which are not related to the 
severance. The mere fact that they are in court 
does not expand the general scope. This is my 
interpretation of the Syms' case." 
* * * 
"I appreciate the fact that there is a great deal 
of difference in the interpretation between coun-
sel as to the law applicable to this case." 
In the Sine case the State Road Commission con-
structed its freeway system crossing N,orth Temple 
Street near the SeRancho Motel in Salt Lake City. 
The freeway missed the motel property on the north 
side of North Temple Street, but it was necessary to 
acquire a portion of a residential property located on 
the south side of North Temple Street, which was 
owned by the same property owners. When the State 
Road Commission brought action to condemn a portion 
of the residential property, Sine filed a counter-claim 
to secure "consequential damage" to the SeRancho 
Motel property. In dismissing the counter-claim on 
the basis of sovereign immunity under the authority 
of Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, supra, this Court. 
pointed out that the " ... motel property (had) no 
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economic or f nnctional connection with . . . " the resi-
dential property. This Court further pointed out that 
by means of a counter-claim a litigant cannot cast him-
self in any other role than that of a plaintiff. 
Defendants submit that there is not the slightest 
comparison on the facts between the Sine case and this 
matter. The plaintiff in this case certainly felt that 
the properties here being taken were part and parcel 
of an integrated unit holding, as illustrated by its trial 
map (Exh. A), its identical exhibit attached to its 
complaint (R. 1-Exh. A-Y), and in its very pleading 
in the Complaint (R. 1-11), wherein it stated: 
"6. That the parcels of real property sought 
to be condemned, ... are but a part of an entire 
parcel or tract or piece of property, or interest 
therein or to property owned by aforesaid de-
fendants." 
Consistently, in their Answer these defendants did 
not set forth any counter-claim (as happened in the 
Sine case), but affirmatively answered the Complaint 
(R. 18) and asserted damages to their residence and 
remaining tract of land, and specifically pointed out 
that their access to Seventh Street had been destroyed, 
that a 17 foot fill had been placed in front of their home, 
that their frontage had been interfered with, and that 
they had been left with their home on a dead-end street. 
The matter went to trial with no attempt on plaintiff's 
part to assert sovereign immunity or to otherwise strike 
these damage claims from the proceedings. 
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As to whether the remammg properties of these 
defendants had any "economic or functional" connection 
with the portion taken, by way of making comparisons 
with the Sine case, it appears self evident that the home 
and contiguous land holdings of these defendants were 
highly related in use and value to Seventh Street which 
ran along the front of their properties, and to the 
specific areas taken from them in Seventh Street and 
beyond Seventh Street. Further, since the plaintiff 
was condemning a strip of land in the public street to 
which these defendants held fee title for many years 
-which carried with it a corresponding annual l)bli-
gation to make payment of property taxes - the use 
of their home and the surrounding lands was highly 
integrated with and dependent upon an obstructed 
access to Seventh Street and the right to have uninter-
rupted use of their easements of light and view. 
To say that this case presents a situation analogous 
lo the Sine case in view of the clear-cut visible facts 
would be to carry the principle of that case to an absurd 
and ridiculous extreme. Further, a holding that sove-
reign immunity could possibly exist under the factual 
situation here present would undoubtedly open the door 
to the State's claiming sovereign immunity in probably 
half of the pending and future highway cases, with 
resulting chaos. Despite actual takings of property, 
the State could then attempt to claim that sovereign 
immunity existed because there was no "substantial" 
taking, or that damages could not be considered unless 
of a type unusual and unique as compared with those 
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sustained by other property owners in the neighbor-
hood. Such a holding would simply flood this court with 
future appeals from both sides. 
Although the State's appraiser did not find any 
"severance" damage to the remaining property (Tr. 
68), following the views of the Court and stating that 
there were three homes on the west side of the freeway 
(and on the north of Seventh Street) which had also 
been somewhat similarly affected by the overpass struc-
ture (Tr. 70-71) , the land owners' appraiser, Haven 
J. Barlow, found substantial severance damages-utiliz-
ing the contrary definition of severance which did not 
require the damages to the affected properties to be 
different and unique to this particular property as dis-
tinguished from others in the neighborhood (Tr. 28, 
39, 41). Mr. Barlow attributed damages to the affected 
Stanger holdings in the amount of $5,806.00 (Tr. 38), 
resulting from the following factors: A portion of 
the property (including the home) was now left on a 
dead-end street; mail service, garbage service and simi-
lar services would no longer be available as before; the 
17 foot fill (located 79 feet from the home) was un-
sightly and practically eliminated all view from the 
front of the home; that there was a degree of hazard 
created by the high overpass; and that there was a sub-
stantial loss of privacy (Tr. 44-48). 
He felt that the home and lot, plus two adversely 
affected acres lying immediately east of the home, were 
originally worth $18,896.50 (Tr. 35), but that because 
24 
of the factors entering into a reduction in value of those 
same properties, they were worth $13,090.00 after the 
taking - or a total severance damage of $5,806.00 
(Tr. 38). 
Plaintiff will undoubtedly claim that the jury 
found there was no severance damages to the remaining 
properties of the Stangers. In anticipation of such an 
argument, the jury verdict form, and answers, is here 
reproduced (Instruction No. 8) : 
You are instructed that your award will be 
determined as follows: 
1. The loss in value to the defendants' 
remaining land and improvements be-
cause of the severance of the land taken 
and the construction of the project as de-
signed, is, if any ........................................ $ -0-
2. How much of the above, if any, are 
severance damages ...................................... $ -0-
3. How much, if any, of the above are 
non-compensatory incidental damages .... $ -0-
Dated this 2t8h day of June, 1967. 
Sid L. W. Kasting 
Jury Foreman 
Answering any argument plaintiff might make 
that the insertion of the amount "None" in answer to 
the first question of the verdict form has significance 
in this case, the following points are submitted as ex-
planatory of the jury's finding: 
1. Under Instruction No. 7 it was made clear 
to the jury that there could be no "severance" 
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damages unless defendants had sustained dam-
ages unique and different from those of neigh-
bors who had not actually lost lands; 
2. Throughout the trial the Court interrupted 
the proceedings to furnish the jury with many 
illustrations of situations where damages could 
not be secured because of actions affecting streets 
and highways (Tr. 42, 43); as to whether loss 
of view was a "consequential damage" common 
to the neighborhood ... or a true severance q ues-
tion (Tr. 45) ; the inability of Slim Olson to 
recover damages to his business because of the 
moving of the highway (Tr. 82) ; that the large 
motel (Se R~ncho) in Salt Lake City could not 
recover since there was no taking even though 
they "broke the motel" (Tr. 94); asking the 
jury to determine if other people on the west 
side of the freeway from the Stangers had in 
fact sustained economic loss and, if so, implying 
that any such situation would bar recovery by 
these defendants (Tr. 43, 94 )-all of which 
heavily impressed the jury as to the Court's 
thinking in this case. 
3. The appraiser for the State found no dam-
ages by way of "severance" (Tr. 68) , since he 
obviously was following the same test relative 
to severance damages used by the Court in that 
they must be "special and unique" in the neigh-
borhood; and he elaborated extensively on some-
what similarly situated homes located on the west 
side of the freeway (Tr. 70-71 ) . 
4. The jury had no basis for segregating items 
of damage inasmuch as neither appraiser at-
d J " " tempte to segregate namages as to severance 
items vs. "consequential" items, or as between 
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either of the foregoing and "non-compensatory 
incidental damages." 
5. The verdict form, as written by the trial 
judge, when taken with the instructions in gen-
eral, is submitted by this writer to be both legally 
incorrect and gramatically confusing; that this, 
in part, undoubtedly concerned the jury arriv-
ing at its 6-2 decision. 
II. 
THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMU-
NITY IS INAPPLICABLE IN EMINENT DO-
MAIN CASES \VHERE SEVERANCE DA.M-
AGES RESULT FROM THE TAKING OF 
RE AL PROPERTY, OR ESTABLISHED 
EASEMENTS OR OTHER RIGHTS APPUR-
TENANT TO REAL PROPERTY. 
The logical end result of the lower Court's confu-
sion between severance damages and consequential 
damages, and the damage factors applicable to each, 
logically extended itself into a belief that-after all-
this case was really one where the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity should be applied. Support for this propo-
sition is clearly evident from the lower Court's pre-
viously quoted statement that he felt the Syms' (Sine) 
case controlled this case. Further, the verdict form bears 
out this observation. 
To further distinguish this case from State Road 
Commission v. Parker (Sine), 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P 2d 
li85, here the affected and damaged properties of these 
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defendants were directly tied to the fee title and estab-
lished easement interests being taken. Specifically, as 
previously pointed out, these defendants owned one-
half of Seventh Street in its original condition in fee 
simple; similarly, and notwithstanding any fee title 
interest, they had traveled directly from their home and 
garage area to and from Seventh Street in its pre-
viously unaltered condition, and their residence enjoyed 
an unobstructed easement of light and view. It would 
serve no real purpose here to quote from the many 
cases in Utah and from other jurisdictions recognizing 
such properly rights, particularly since the 1963 legis-
lative revisions to the Highway Code in Utah clearly 
recognize and authorize the acquisition for highway 
purposes of just such interests: 
27-12-96 ACQUISITION OF RIGHTS-
OF-W AY AND OTHER REAL PROP-
ER TY - The commission is authorized to ac-
quire any real property or interests therein, 
deemed necessary for temporary, present, or 
reasonable future state highway purposes by 
gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemna-
tion, or otherwise. Highway purposes as used in 
this act shall include, but shall not be limited 
to the following: 
( 3) Limited access facilities, inclnding rights 
of access, air, light and view, and frontage and 
service roads to highways. 
In the case of Utah Road Commission v. Hansen 
(1963) 14 U. 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 917, this Court ob-
served that-
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" . . .an easement of access contemplates a 
traveled way from the property to the highway." 
"Absent an established easement, all the abut-
ting owner is entitled to is some reasonable means 
of access to the highways ... " 
"We are aware that in the case of Dooly Block 
v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co. (9 U. 31, 33 
P 229) this Court stated that an owner whose 
property abuts an established public street had 
an easement of access thereto, and we agree that 
where such is taken it would constitute the tak-
ing of property covered by our eminent domain 
statute ... " 
Since defendants used the former Seventh Street 
for purposes of ingress and egress for a great many 
years, by what process of reasoning can it be said that 
a property right had not been condemned and taken 
from them because they were furnished with another 
route to the same street by a greatly inferior means of 
access and which left their properties on a dead-end 
street? It is submitted that the trial judge completely 
disregarded the Hansen case in this instance. 
The Hansen case states that a reasonable access 
to the highway system should be accorded all proper-
ties, but aside from the factual issue as to whether or 
not an access is or is not reasonable it clearly holds 
that establi.shed easements of access must be considered 
i in the severance damage analysis. Further, with respect 
to the north half of Seventh Street, these defendants 
owned fee title, and the only interest in that street 
which the public had acquired was a public easement 
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of travel. This was clearly recognized here because the 
plaintiff determined it necessary to condemn the fee 
interest in the street. 
Plaintiff may attempt to claim that the actual 
physical construction of the overpass fill in front of 
defendants' residence did not extend north of the origi-
nal center line of Seventh Street into the fee title area 
which defendants previously owned, thereby leaving 
the defendants "half" of the original Seventh Street 
fully available to them at that point. However, such 
an argument completely fails to establish any material 
point of advantage for many reasons, among which are 
these: 
I. The portion of the original Seventh Street 
now left defendants' use is actually no longer 
"Seventh Street" -- it is now a dead-end 
"service" road; 
2. By acquiring fee title to the north half of 
what was formerly Seventh Street, the plain-
tiff acquired full rights to that area, includ-
ing its use for maintenance of the overpass 
fill (Tr. 12); and 
3. Complete dominion was thereby acquired by 
plaintiff to place fill in any portion of the 
green area, which plaintiff's engineer indicat-
ed might be the case along the easterly por-
tion of the green area being condemned 
(Tr. 11). 
In any eminent domain proceeding it is a simple 
matter for the condemning authority to limit the right, 
or the extent of the right, being taken. Whenever a fee 
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or au easement taking occurs the courts have uniformly 
held that it must be presumed that the taking was 
calculated with the intention that the rights acquired 
would be exercised in the most injurious manner legally 
possible. Courts have consistently taken a dim view of 
arguments advanced by condemning authorities based 
on the premise that, although they were taking a com-
plete fee title, their intentions were not to fully utilize 
such rights acquired and, therefore, that the damages 
should only be measured by the "intended" use which 
they then planned to make. See Richardson v. Big 
Indian District (N ebraska-1967), 151 N .\V. 2d 283; 
Sullivan v. Marcello (R. I.-1966), 214 A. 2d 181; and 
People v. Lundy (California-1966), 47 Cal. Rep. 694. 
The cases involving damages where there have 
been actual takings of property-thereby avoiding the 
problem of sovereign immunity-have substantially 
ruled that "viaduct-fill and dead-end" situations give 
rise to severance damages as a matter of law. The 
measure of such damages is, of course, always a matter 
of determination. 
In the case of Weber Basin District v. Gailey 
(1956), 5 U. 2d 385, 303 P. 2d 271, it was observed 
that-
" ... we have held that a change in the grade 
of an adjoining highway and the building of a 
viaduct in the adjoining street inflicted com-
pensable damages to the property of the adjoin-
ing landowner." 
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The foregoing rule was probably best set forth in 
the case of State Road Com,mission v. Fourth District 
Court (1937), 94 U. 384, 78 P. 2d 502, which involved 
the building of a viaduct along Center Street in Provo, 
Utah. The factual comparison is generally identical 
with this case, except that it did not appear in the 
Fourth District Court case that there was any necessity 
that the State Road Commission acquire any properties 
from any of the defendants abutting the affected street, 
thus distinguishing the two cases insofar as this Court's 
present view of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is 
involved. In passing on the facts presented in that 
case, this Court stated: 
"We think it clear that the framers of the con-
stitution did not intend to give the rights granted 
by Section 22, and then leave the citizen power-
less to enforce such rights. We hold that this is 
so whether the injury complained of by the 
Plaintiff's in the injunction suit is considered a 
'taking' of property or a 'damaging' of prop-
erty. The framers of the fundamental law, after 
much debate and careful consideration of the 
hardship of the old rule which allowed compen-
sation only in the case of a taking of property, 
wrote into the constitution a provision by which 
we think they intended to guarantee to the land-
owner whose property is damaged just compen-
sation with the same certainty as to the land-
owner whose property is physically taken." 
In the case of Dooly Block v. Salt Lake Rapid 
Transit Co. (1893) 9 U. 31, 33 P. 229, our Court long 
ago recognized that, when properly in court, a land-
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owner could recover for established rights of easement 
interfered with by condemning authorities: 
"It would seem that he (abutting property 
owner) had, in common with the rest of the pub-
lic a right of passage but it was also further 
seen that he had rights not shared by the public 
at large, special and peculiar to himself, and 
which arose out of the relation of his lot to the 
street in front of it; and that these rights, whether 
the bare fee of the street was in the lot owner 
or in the city, were rights of property, and as 
such, ought to be, and were, sacred from legis-
lative invasion as his right to the lot itself." 
In this case the defendants submitted to the Court 
an Instruction covering the basic factual situation in-
volved. The proposed instruction was denied by the 
Court, and exception was duly taken. It fallows: 
"Under the law of the State of Utah a land-
owner having prop~rties bordering a street or 
highway is entitled to recover damages sustained 
by his adjoining properties if the grade of the 
street or highway is substantially changed, either 
by the placement or removal of fill material in 
the roadway area or by the building of a viaduct, 
overpass or similar structure. In determining 
the amount of damages to the adjoining prop-
erties in view of their highest and best use ur 
uses, you may consider the effect of such change 
in grade on the various factors which would be 
considered ~y willing buyers and sellers in de-
termining market value." 
Defendants submit that the refusal to give the 
foregoing instruction, since the issues were properly 
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before the court and the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
was not available to the plaintiff, was clear error. In 
lieu of the proposed instruction the Court gave its in-
struction No. 10 (R. 39), attempting to cover generally 
the same law and subject matter. This writer will leave 
to the Court the problem of analyzing the Instruction 
actually given if it so desires - to which exceptions 
were taken by defendants on the basis of containing 
incorrect statements of law and of being inapplicable to 
the facts of this case. It is felt that a complete analysis 
of the Instruction would probably not result in 
lessening the confusion created by the Instruction as 
written. 
It does not require extensive analysis to understand 
why courts in general have been greatly disturbed with 
the effect upon market value caused by these "viaduct-
fill and dead-end" situations. The effect of such obstruc-
tions and their interference with access and view have 
been the subjects of extensive court opinions and com-
ments in recent years in a great number of cases from 
other jurisdictions. In the case of Dennison v. State 
(New York-1966), 265 N. Y. S. 2d 671, that Court 
extensively reviewed and commented upon the adverse 
effect upon the value of a home caused by a highway 
embankment being constructed in front of it. In 
DuPuy v. City of Waco (Texas-1966), 396 S. W. 2d 
103, that Court held that where a property owner had 
full access to a level abutting street and where highway 
construction had created an elevated overpass in its 
place at a height of 14 feet, thereby requiring the 
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property owner to get access through a service route 
which left the property in a dead-end, or cul-de-sac, 
such interference with access entitled the landowner 
to get damages as a matter of law. Even as to ware-
house properties, the case of People v. Wasserman 
(Calif.-1966), 50 Cal. Rep. 95, recognized that an 
i. easement of reasonable view of one's property from the 
highway to the property is a valuable property right 
which, if existing, entitles the property owner to com-
pensation. Space does not permit commenting upon 
the great number of cases recognizing these property 
interests. 
The Utah Rule set forth in the Fourth District 
Court case is stated in 26 Am. J ur. 2d, Sec. 242, P. 931, 
as follows: 
" ... many courts hold that an owner is en-
titled to compensation where all access from his 
property to the system of streets in one direction 
is cut off, so that his property is left at the end 
of a cul-de-sac, at least where the market 'value 
of the property is lessened thereby. An abutting 
owner on a public street has been said to have 
a special right and a vested interest in the right 
to use the whole of the street for ingress and 
egress, light, view, and air, and that if the vaca-
tion of a portion of the street opposite his prop-
erty should materially diminish his light, air, 
view, or access, he has a right to have the amount 
of damage determined by the jury." 
(Nichols on Eminent Domain is in accord-
Sec. 16.101 (5)) 
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The concept of sovereign immunity in such situa-
tions is not in issue since such takings directly and 
substantially affect contiguous properties having both 
a functional and economic relationship. Perhaps, as 
Justice \Vade observed in the Fairclough case in his 
dissent, had there been no need for the taking of any 
land from these defendants, they might be in the posi-
tion of having no remedy by virtue of the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, since there was not a total destruc-
tion of access so as to invoke principles of equity-
as observed by Justice IIenriod in the Springville Bank-
ing Company case. Nevertheless, this writer intends to 
make some observations concerning the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity in eminent domain cases inasmuch 
as it was a factor which actually entered into the trial 
of this case. 
Rather than boldly advance a possibly unpopular 
suggestion to this Court that the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity advanced in the Fairclough case is wrong in 
eminent domain cases, and that Utah stands practically 
alone-as it really does-in "inverse" condemnation 
situations among those states providing constitutional 
mandates that just compensation shall be made for 
properties taken "or damaged", this writer will point 
out some of the awkward results which the court-
adopted concept of sovereign immunity creates in emi-
nent domain situations. 
Once the doctrine of sovereign immunity is adopted 
by any court in eminent domain cases with constitu-
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tional mand;ttes similar to those of Utah, the problem 
alwa) s becomes one of where to draw the line. Until 
this instant case came along, it possibly could have 
been said with reasonable certainty that sovereign im-
munity in eminent domain cases ceas~d to apply once 
the condemning state agency actually acquired a prop-
erty interest in a court action, thereby submitting itself 
to the court's jurisdiction and effecting a waiver of its 
sovereign: immunity. Of course, the foregoing state-
ment is made with full knowledge of the factual limi-
tions of the Sine case. Thus, a property owner whose 
lands have been taken in part is in a position to recover 
damages to his remaining properties which are f unc-
tionally or economically affected via the route of sever-
ance damages. On the other hand, a property owner 
in the position of Fairclough (except in situations 
where the action might leave him landlocked) i!) power-
less tb recover any damages. The illustration just given 
shows the two extremes; but the intermediate grey 
' areas will show how ridiculous the concept of sovereign 
immunity becomes in actual practice. 
Several years ago a highway department in the 
State of Oregon constructed a road through a rancher's 
property, and refused to instigate eminent domain pro-
ceedings or to make arrangements to purchase the prop-
erties. 'Ve can certainly assume that this would be the 
classic example of a state's sovereign immunity or, 
bluntly stated, "thumbing the nose". However, the 
enraged property owner, being advised that the courts 
were not going to help him at all, barricaded both ends 
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of the road where it crossed his properties, erected a 
headquarters in the middle of the road, put a rifle on 
his lap, and dared anyone to trespass upon his land~. 
Despite a great amount of publicity and the usual 
threats by impressive public officials with a lot of gov-
ernmental power behind them, the matter finally re-
solved itself into that of making a settlement with the 
property owner. It seemed that no one wanted to get 
shot-including state officials-for the deliberate tres-
pass, and the state was sort of "smoked out." 
The foregoing story quite accurately illustrates the 
situation in Utah today and, in this writer's opinion, 
points out how absurd the doctrine of sovereign immu· 
nity can become in these eminent domain cases. Simply 
stated, in about 99% of' the cases (other than those 
within the limited range of the "Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act") the only "taking'' situations where 
the State of Utah is presently vulnerable to damages 
are those where it requires a physical surface or suv· 
surface use of a property in the form of a fee title or 
an easement interest. This statement will bear up under 
close scrutiny. This writer makes the further observa· 
tion that the State of Utah (nudged along by the U.S. 
Bureau of' Public Roads) could and would, within the 
protection of the doctrine of sovereign immunity now 
prevailing in Utah, even take fee title and easement 
rights without payment of' compensation, except for 
either or both of two basic reasons: (I) That some 
higher authority requires that there be a transfer of 
title to a legal interest in real property in order to 
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satisfy title and conveyancing requirements; or ( 2) 
the property owner could physically utilize self-help, 
notwithstanding the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
The foregoing observations are blunt, to-the-point, 
and accurate. Sovereign immunity permits the State 
in many situations to acquire, damage or destroy rights 
and easements of access, light and view, and similar 
property rights which a property-owner may have with-
out going to court or paying compensation. There is 
a taking of property when such rights are acquired 
just as much and real in the eyes of the law as if the 
surface or sub-surface physical use of a property is 
involved. 
In support of the foregoing, 26 Am. J ur. 2d, 
Eminent Domain, Sec. 200, p. 882, states-
"As a general thing, where the easements of 
access, light, air, and view are recognized in an 
abutting owner, the devotion of the adjacent 
street or highway to inconsistent uses destructive 
of such easements is a taking of property within 
a constitutional provision requiring compensa-
tion therefor . . ." (Italics added) 
In short, easement rights in the nature of appur-
tenances can often be taken in Utah by the State with-
\ out payment of just compensation as provided by our 
Constitution, as well as consequential damages to prop-
erties not taken. If we re-analyze the aforementioned 
three sub-sections of Section 78-34-10, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
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often denies all manner of compensation to a propertv 
owner when a State taking occurs unless there has been 
an underlying fee title taking, or an easement taking 
- except in possible rare cases as mentioned in the 
Springville Banking Co. case. Actually, the very recog-
nition of such an exception constitutes an effective 
admission that sovereign immunity is a make-shift 
proposition completely out of harmony with the Con-
stitution. Unless such types of actual takings occur, 
all and every other manner of damage set forth in the 
three sub-sections of that statutory section fall before 
sovereign immunity. 
A further practical analysis of property rights 
taken, such as light and air, access, etc., reveals that it, 
is virtually impossible to place a dollar value upon such i 
I 
property rights. Any qualified valuation appraiser 
1 
will, and must, value these property rights in relation 1• 
to the remaining affected properties. This is proper 
appraisal practice and technique; in fact, it is usually : 
the only method by which such rights can be valued, I 
since these rights are appurtenances to the remaining 
properties after a taking has occurred. 
The appraisal problem presents a practical reason 
why sovereign immunity must not apply in severance 
situations involving damages to the remaining prop· 
erties where there has been a taking of a portion of 
the property. But the same reasoning applies, notwith· 
standing the prior position taken by a majority of this 
Court, in all cases where damage occurs to properties 
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not taken and where there has not been a taking of a 
1 portion of the property. If Section 22 of Article I of 
our Utah Constitution has any significance at all, there 
can be no answer but that sovereign immunity has no 
place in the picture : 
"Private property shall not be taken or dam-
aged for public use without just compensation." 
Any other conclusion will eventually create mount-
' ing confusion in the eminent domain law. 
Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States provides-
" ... nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws." 
Since a State acts through its courts, and inasmuch 
as the courts in Utah sanction the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity in taking or damaging situations of all types 
: other than the exceptions previously noted, how can it 
I be said that there is not a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in permitting the taking of property rights 
under sovereign immunity? Further, where is the equal 
protection of the laws which permits one property 
owner to recover where a portion of his properties are 
taken, but which denies recovery to another property 
owner sustaining identical damages but having no prop-
erties taken? It is submitted that the doctrine of sove-
reign immunity will not stand up against our State and 
Federal Constitutional mandates. 
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CONCLUSION 
The argument and analysis in this brief quite pos- : 
sibly has extended beyond that which is necessary to 
a reversal in view of the basic errors made by the lower 
Court and counsel for plaintiff associated with the con- :. 
fusion between "severance" and "consequential" dam-
ages. Further, the additional inter-related issue of sove-
reign immunity which was interjected into the case 
raises a specter of ominous proportions for the property 
owners, their lawyers and the courts in this State if 
the legal errors are not clearly corrected in this decision. 
Since 1958 this writer has personally handled 165 
eminent domain cases involving court condemnations 
of properties and property rights primarily related to 
river and reservoir projects, community utilities, na-
tional park and recreational acquisitions, and highway 
1 
acquisitions. Of this number, 120 cases have gone 
through trial. If indications received from officials of 
the Federal Bureau of Public Roads are meaningful, 
this writer has handled more cases involving condemna-
tion acquisitions for property owners since 1960 than 
possibly any other attorney in the nation. This infor-
mation is advanced because of assertions made in this 
brief as to the results which probably will occur if this 
case is not reversed. 
It is not a pleasant prospect to imagine the trouble 
which will occur in our courts if, in condemnation 
actions involving the State of Utah where there has 
been an actual taking of a portion of one's property, 
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the dispute degenerates into a search for other affected 
properties in the vicinity which are not involved in 
actual takings but which have sustained somewhat simi-
lar type damages, in part, to those sustained by the 
defendant litigant. To imagine the problems involved 
in arguing the degree of comparative damage (which 
would have meaningless effect in most cases )-and the 
impossible attempts to segregate allowable "severance" 
damages from unallowable "consequential" damages-
is a frightening prospect. This Court should clearly 
define the distinction and set the law straight once and 
for all on this matter inasmuch as it appears that the 
language of the Croft case has not been sufficiently 
convincing. In all of the cases tried by this writer not 
one has presented legal issues and results as they de-
veloped during the trial of this action. 
On the matter of sovereign immunity in eminent 
domain cases, it is submitted that this case certainly 
is not one where the doctrine should even be considered. 
, Nevertheless, since a great number of similar cases are 
reaching our courts each year, this writer earnestly 
requests this Court to have another good hard look at 
the doctrine, its ramifications, and its applicability in 
eminent domain situations. It is again submitted that 
the doctrine will not stand up to analysis, reason, and 
' the applicable Constitutional provisions. 
The great impact of eminent domain proceedings 
in recent years clearly points the trend of the future. 
It is submitted that this method of acquiring private 
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property rights is probably-next to the power of tax. 
ation-the greatest device whereby property rights can 
be confiscated without the payment of just compensa-
tion. This erosion of private property rights is possible 
because the property owner has his property taken 
against his will, he is forced to pay legal fees in his 
defense and must pay expensive appraisal costs in valu-
ing his property and his damages, there is nothing 
allowed to him for loss of business profits, and the avail-
able relief for moving costs and similar non-compensable 
items is only partial via other laws. The property owner 
has no way of being compensation for the anguish 
associated with losing the one item of property which 
has been most sacred since the departure of the feudal 
system when the common law provided that a man could 
own title to real property. Further, even in a trial 
seeking just compensation, it is submitted that the 
property owner, having the burden of proof as an· 
nounced by our Utah Supreme Court, can really hardly 
hope for compensation equal to that of the true loss 
of market value. 
The judgment should be reversed and the matter 
remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Glen E. Fuller 
Attorney for Defendants 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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